Given the growing importance of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), it is surprising that there is no consensus of what the term SRI means to an investor. Further, most studies of this question rely solely on the views of investors who already invest in SRI funds. Our study surveys a unique pool of approximately 5,000 investors that contains both investors who have used SRI criteria in investment decisions and those who have not, and involves a broad array of criteria associated with (...) SR investing. Our findings offer new insight into the SRI debate. For both sets of investors, environmental and sustainability issues dominate as the major category associated with SR investing. We find strong agreement in the ranking of the relative importance of various SRI factors despite differences between these two groups in their opinion of their overall importance. We also find that investors prefer to consider the SRI question in more holistic terms rather than using the exclusionary format favored by most SRI funds. Investors seem to prefer to reward firms who display overall positive social behavior rather than to exclude firms on the basis of certain products or practices. These findings can help providers of SR investment vehicles to improve the SRI products that they offer to the general investor, thus both encouraging the initial adoption of SR criteria by investors and increasing overall investment in SR choices. (shrink)

I examine the views of the renowned Catholic environmentalist, Thomas Berry, C.P., by comparing them with those of Thomas Aquinas, an author Berry frequently references. I intend to show that while the two share a number of views in common, ultimately the two diverge on many foundational issues, resulting in differing conclusions as to how we should regard and treat the environment. Aquinas upholds divine transcendence, whereas Berry regards the notion of divine transcendence to lead (...) to the exploitation of creation and locates the divine in the universe itself. Berry accordingly thinks that we should revere all natural things, whereas Aquinas thinks we should revere God and creatures in God’s image. Aquinas maintains that the human soul is created by God and is in God’s image. He sees our rational soul as placing us above other natural things, and from it follows our responsibility to care for nature. Berry, to the contrary, sees this affirmation of discontinuity between humans and the rest of nature to be the root of our environmental woes, as providing a justification for human exploitation of nature. For Berry, humans have no special status, but are one member alongside others in the earth community. Rather than being created by God, “humans have nothing but what they receive from the universe.” By highlighting both the similarities and differences between these authors, I hope to contribute to the project of formulating a sound environmental ethics. (shrink)

There are two main formulations of a key causal principle in the Cartesian a priori philosophical system: one, present in Meditation III, says that the cause of the representational content of an idea must be situated at the same or higher level in ontology than the level at which the object represented is situated, the other, present in the axioms section of the Second Replies, says that the cause must contain the same property as is represented by the idea. This (...) central chapter defends four main contentions. The same‐property formulation is basic in Descartes's system. The notion of causality in the basic causal principle does not represent a spatio temporally extended natural process but a form of intentional explanation. When point is combined with the interpretation of the rule of truth offered in Ch. 2, the rule of truth and the basic causal principle prove to be equivalent. Finally, in light of, there is one main pattern of inference in Cartesian epistemology taking the rule of truth/causal principle as its major premise and underlying all of Descartes arguments from my ideas to the existence of things outside my ideas, including the proof of my own existence, the proof of the existence of God in Meditations III and V and the proof of the existence of the external world in Meditation VI and the Principles of Philosophy II,1. (shrink)

Basic Cartesian intuitions are directed at simple natures, not truths; but intuitions are also a foundation for propositional knowledge. There are two basic objectives of this chapter: to show how Descartes gets from intuitions to propositional knowledge, and to show how his solution to this problem structures his thinking on the main issues in Cartesian epistemology. I maintain that the solution to is to be found in the principle if we perceive the presence of an attribute A, there must be (...) an actually existing substance to which A is attributed. This principle gets its clearest expression in the Principles of Philosophy but also appears in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind and in the Meditations where, I argue, it appears in the form of the Rule of Truth. I show how this principle is derived from the cogito, understood both as inference and as intuition, how this principle plays a role in Descartes theory of consciousness and self‐knowledge, in the case for substance dualism, and in the theory of clear and distinct ideas. (shrink)

There are two main objectives in this chapter: to give a preliminary formal statement of the inference from my ideas to the existence of things outside my ideas in Descartes's epistemology, and to develop the main outlines of Cartesian ontology and the theory of ideas. Key notions discussed are those of truth, possibility, existence, and related notions; representation of ideas, and formally and eminently contained properties in substances; the ontological status of immutable essences and eternal truths. Among contentions made in (...) this chapter about Cartesian ontology is that essences are contained in the mind not as modes but as quasi‐platonic entities, that there is in Descartes's theory of ideas, a general difference between the objects of ideas and the mode of presentation of the objects that holds even when the objects are essences; and that this difference leads to an epistemic rather than a causal account of the distinction between formal and eminent containment. (shrink)

The leading idea of this chapter is that, for Descartes, intellectual ideas make it obvious what metaphysical category the properties they disclose to the mind fall into but not whether they are actually exemplified; sensations make it obvious whether the properties they disclose to the mind are exemplified but not what their metaphysical category is. This idea is worked out through a discussion of three stages in the development of Descartes's doctrine of the material falsity of sensory ideas, the core (...) concept of his error explanation of the senses. Material falsity is a set of three defects that sensations have in comparison with intellectual ideas, ideas that fully discharge the role, which Descartes assigns to ideas in his philosophical system. The first stage, reflected in Meditation III, identifies material falsity with two defects: nonrepresentation and misrepresentation ; the second stage, reflected in the Reply to Arnauld, identifies material falsity with obscure ideas ; the third stage, reflected in the Principles of Philosophy I, sees the terminology of material falsity disappear and the terminology of clear but not distinct ideas appear. Other topics discussed include a special application of the rule of truth and skepticism. (shrink)

How can a Cartesian idea represent ordinary physical objects? One possibility is that Descartes holds a theory of natural signs according to which ideas, including sensations, represent states of the external world that are correlated with them. I deny that Descartes has a theory of natural signs in this sense, arguing, instead, that our perception of ordinary physical objects is achieved not through ideas, properly speaking, but through a special act of the mind which projects its sensations onto objects in (...) the external world, objects truly represented by ideas of primary qualities alone. This ”projection” comprises referral judgments that account for the characteristic phenomenology of experience of the physical world but in a way that misleads us to think that our ideas bear a resemblance to the underlying metaphysical reality of the physical world. Other issues discussed include Descartes's taxonomy of ideas. (shrink)

It seems undeniable that we have both sense experience of primary qualities and sense experience of secondary qualities, and yet, based on a text in the Sixth Replies among others, many commentators have thought that Descartes denied precisely this for primary qualities. One of the main burdens of this chapter is to show that Descartes does have an account of the sense experience of primary qualities and that it is to be found in Descartes's account of the faculty of imagination. (...) The chapter argues that a version of the proof of the external world depends on a special class of ideas of this faculty. There are two sides to Descartes's account: the philosophical theory of ideas, including the taxonomy of perceptual responses developed in the Sixth Replies of the Meditations, and the empirical theory in the Optics and the Treatise on Man, and they are both treated in depth here. Finally, the chapter argues that Descartes has an empirical and philosophical account of the phenomenological fusion of primary and secondary qualities, the former accomplished by means of images in the corporeal imagination and the mechanism of referred sensations in The Passions of the Soul. (shrink)

Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense experience discussed in Chs. 4, 5 and 7, and a theory of natural reasons, discussed here. The theory of natural reasons, based on Descartes's notion of natural inclinations, is expressed here in terms of a series of warrant principles of which there are two main kinds: those that warrant action and those that (...) warrant claims for what is true. This chapter traces Descartes's epistemically ambivalent attitude to cognitive dispositions from the early treatment in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind through to the final treatment in The Passions of the Soul. The chapter focuses special attention on the appearance of one kind of natural reason, reasons of truth, in the proof of the external world in Meditation VI and the striking absence of same in the proof of the external world in the Principles of Philosophy II. The chapter also considers whether natural reasons apply to particular aspects of corporeal things, concluding with a discussion of the Cartesian Circle. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence research and regulation seek to balance the benefits of innovation against any potential harms and disruption. However, one unintended consequence of the recent surge in AI research is the potential re-orientation of AI technologies to facilitate criminal acts, term in this article AI-Crime. AIC is theoretically feasible thanks to published experiments in automating fraud targeted at social media users, as well as demonstrations of AI-driven manipulation of simulated markets. However, because AIC is still a relatively young and inherently (...) interdisciplinary area—spanning socio-legal studies to formal science—there is little certainty of what an AIC future might look like. This article offers the first systematic, interdisciplinary literature analysis of the foreseeable threats of AIC, providing ethicists, policy-makers, and law enforcement organisations with a synthesis of the current problems, and a possible solution space. (shrink)

Thomas C. Vinci argues that Kant's Deductions demonstrate Kant's idealist doctrines and have the structure of an inference to the best explanation for correlated domains. With the Deduction of the Categories the correlated domains are intellectual conditions and non-geometrical laws of the empirical world. With the Deduction of the Concepts of Space, the correlated domains are the geometry of pure objects of intuition and the geometry of empirical objects.

Spanning thirty years of intensive research, this book proves what many scholars could not explain: that today’s Western world must be considered the product of both Greek and Indian thought—Western and Eastern philosophies. Thomas McEvilley explores how trade, imperialism, and migration currents allowed cultural philosophies to intermingle freely throughout India, Egypt, Greece, and the ancient Near East. This groundbreaking reference will stir relentless debate among philosophers, art historians, and students.

Brickhouse and Smith cast new light on Plato's early dialogues by providing novel analyses of many of the doctrines and practices for which Socrates is best known. Included are discussions of Socrates' moral method, his profession of ignorance, his denial of akrasia, as well as his views about the relationship between virtue and happiness, the authority of the State, and the epistemic status of his daimonion.

Artificial Intelligence research and regulation seek to balance the benefits of innovation against any potential harms and disruption. However, one unintended consequence of the recent surge in AI research is the potential re-orientation of AI technologies to facilitate criminal acts, term in this chapter AI-Crime. AIC is theoretically feasible thanks to published experiments in automating fraud targeted at social media users, as well as demonstrations of AI-driven manipulation of simulated markets. However, because AIC is still a relatively young and inherently (...) interdisciplinary area—spanning socio-legal studies to formal science—there is little certainty of what an AIC future might look like. This chapter offers the first systematic, interdisciplinary literature analysis of the foreseeable threats of AIC, providing ethicists, policy-makers, and law enforcement organisations with a synthesis of the current problems, and a possible solution space. (shrink)

Socrates' moral psychology is widely thought to be 'intellectualist' in the sense that, for Socrates, every ethical failure to do what is best is exclusively the result of some cognitive failure to apprehend what is best. Until publication of this book, the view that, for Socrates, emotions and desires have no role to play in causing such failure went unchallenged. This book argues against the orthodox view of Socratic intellectualism and offers in its place a comprehensive alternative account that explains (...) why Socrates believed that emotions, desires and appetites can influence human motivation and lead to error. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith defend the study of Socrates' philosophy and offer an alternative interpretation of Socratic moral psychology. Their novel account of Socrates' conception of virtue and how it is acquired shows that Socratic moral psychology is considerably more sophisticated than scholars have supposed. (shrink)

Socrates' moral psychology is widely thought to be 'intellectualist' in the sense that, for Socrates, every ethical failure to do what is best is exclusively the result of some cognitive failure to apprehend what is best. Until publication of this book, the view that, for Socrates, emotions and desires have no role to play in causing such failure went unchallenged. This book argues against the orthodox view of Socratic intellectualism and offers in its place a comprehensive alternative account that explains (...) why Socrates believed that emotions, desires and appetites can influence human motivation and lead to error. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith defend the study of Socrates' philosophy and offer an alternative interpretation of Socratic moral psychology. Their novel account of Socrates' conception of virtue and how it is acquired shows that Socratic moral psychology is considerably more sophisticated than scholars have supposed. (shrink)

Journal of Business Ethicsrecently published a critique of ethical practices in quantitative research by Zyphur and Pierides (J Bus Ethics 143:1–16, 2017). The authors argued that quantitative research prevents researchers from addressing urgent problems facing humanity today, such as poverty, racial inequality, and climate change. I offer comments and observations on the authors’ critique. I agree with the authors in many areas of philosophy, ethics, and social research, while making suggestions for clarification and development. Interpreting the paper through the pragmatism (...) of William James, I suggest that the authors’ arguments are unlikely to change attitudes in traditional quantitative research, though they may point the way to a new worldview, or Jamesian “sub-world,” in social research. (shrink)

This book argues that science and metaphysics are closely and inseparably interwoven in the work of Descartes, such that the metaphysics cannot be understood without the science and vice versa. In order to make his case, Thomas Vinci offers a careful philosophical reconstruction of central parts of Descartes' metaphysics and of his theory of perception, each considered in relation to Descartes' epistemology. Many authors of late have written on the relation between Descartes' metaphysics and his physics, especially insofar as (...) the former was intended to justify the latter. Vinci's work does not focus on this relation. It takes as a broad interpretive principle that Descartes wanted to justify a certain picture of matter with his metaphysics, but it focuses its own efforts on the way in which metaphysics and science meet in Descartes' theory of sense-perception. Vinci aims to show that Descartes gave an important positive role to sense-perception in his epistemology, and also that he used his reflections on sense-perception to frame his criticism of previous theories of the sensory qualities of objects. (shrink)

Sartre's moral thinking progressed from an abstract, idealistic ethics of authenticity to a more concrete, realistic, and materialistic morality. Much of Sartre's important unpublished work on ethics - relevant to both his 'first' and his 'second' ethics - has become available to scholars only in the years since his death. Only now has it become possible to give a complete presentation of both the first and the second ethics and to accurately identify their relationship. Sartre's Two Ethics also presents Professor (...) Anderson's original criticisms of Sartre's two ethics, and concludes that the second is a significant advance over the first. (shrink)

Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith offer a comprehensive historical and philosophical interpretation of, and commentary on, one of Plato's most widely read works, the Apology of Socrates. Virtually every modern interpretation characterizes some part of what Socrates says in the Apology as purposefully irrelevant or even antithetical to convincing the jury to acquit him at his trial. This book, by contrast, argues persuasively that Socrates offers a sincere and well-reasoned defense against the charges he faces. First, the authors establish (...) a consensus of ancient reports about Socrates ' moral and religious principles and show that these prohibit him from needlessly risking the condemnation of the jury. Second, they consider each specific claim made by Socrates in the Apology and show how each can be construed as an honest effort to inform the jurors of the truth and to convince them of his blamelessness. The arguments of this book are informed by a critical review of the scholarly literature and careful attention to the philosophy expressed in Plato's other early dialogues. (shrink)

We extend research on the effects of local audit office characteristics on audit quality by investigating whether audit offices in highly religious U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas exhibit going concern decisions that reflect heightened professional skepticism relative to audit offices in less religious MSAs. Prior research links religiosity to risk aversion and ethical development and suggests audit practice offices in more religious MSAs are more likely to issue going concern opinions because they will assess the effects of mitigating factors in a (...) more skeptical manner. Our results indicate that audit practice offices located in highly religious MSAs are more likely to issue going concern audit opinions, consistent with a more skeptical assessment of mitigating factors. Additional tests provide direct evidence consistent with the argument that these audit offices are more risk averse in issuing going concern opinions. Our findings are relevant to auditors, audit clients, researchers, and regulators. (shrink)

Introduction THOMAS C. HELLER AND DAVID E. WELLBERY A he essays that follow originated in a conference entitled "Reconstructing Individualism," held at ...

Bill New's (1999) thoughtful paper has performed the valuable service of clarifying the meaning and the policy implications of paternalism. His careful formulation delimits the domain of justified state paternalism. Having argued successfully, in our view, for a narrow ambit, New proceeds to identify situations that justify paternalism. This comment is written in the spirit of a friendly reformulation that refines and improves the specification of when paternalism is justified. Our argument is two-fold. First, we argue that New's formulation, properly (...) understood, will not readily permit the paternalistic interventions he argues are justified. Second, we identify a class of potentially justified interventions that have paternalistic aspects, but which are neither strictly paternalistic nor market-failure remedies. (shrink)

"This book is addressed to the one who lives in a passionate quest for deepened awareness, who hungers to touch and taste human existence more intimately, who delights in the celebration of now." "In the era of the multiversity with its fragments of introverted expertise, it does sound absurdly ambitious to make an integrative attempt at synoptic reflection, seeking to conjoin disparate insights from developmental psychology, psychotherapy, ontology, epistemology, ethics, phenomenology, the fine arts, jurisprudence, linguistics, theology, hermeneutics, liturgics, history, and (...) the philosophy of history...Admittedly it is not because I am an expert in any or all of these fields, but instead a human being--a single, experiencing, time-bound, warm-bodied human being--that emboldens me to speak with any assurance about the human situation. More than most other academic bailiwicks, my own academic discipline (theological ethics) invites and demands such integrative reflection on man, culture, time, being and value, dysfunctional and constructive human behavior." "Our thesis: The structure of human awareness emerges directly out of man's temporal situation and his relation to being." (excerpts from the Introduction, by Thomas C. Oden). (shrink)

The essential logical deficiency of the perceptual theory of pain, as I tried to show in my paper,1 is that feeling pain cannot be perceiving anything. The conceptual framework that would make it possible for us to understand “feel” in this use to be a perception concept does not exist. The concept of a glimpse, which George Pitcher relies upon to supply this framework,2cannot begin to do so because it is a secondary perception concept entirely dependent upon that of seeing. (...) This primary concept of visual perception is tied up with actions and supporting concepts like looking, glancing, gazing, glimpsing, watching, and the like. These are different ways in which one's visual perceiving may be characterized. Without the primary concept and the actions connected with it, there would be nothing to characterize. The word “feel” in contexts involving pain is not a perception concept and efforts to make it one are doomed to fail. The supporting actions and concepts do not exist. (shrink)

Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I (...) distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject’s undergoing experiences with those contents requires them to possess the concepts that characterize those contents. I maintain that these ways of understanding conceptualism and nonconceptualism are orthogonal to one another. This is revealed by the conceptual coherence of positions in which the contents of experiences have both conceptual and nonconceptual features; positions which possess their own distinctive sources of philosophical motivation. I argue that the fact that there is a place in conceptual space for such positions, and that there may be good reason for theorists to adopt them, creates difficulties for both the central argument for nonconceptualism and the central argument for conceptualism. I set out each of these arguments; the Argument from Possession-Independence and the Epistemically-Driven Argument. I then try to show how the existence of mixed positions about perceptual content derived from a clear distinction between compositional and possessional considerations constitutes a significant obstacle for those arguments as they stand. The takehome message of the paper is that unless one clearly acknowledges the distinction between issues about the composition of perceptual content and issues about how subject’s capacities to undergo certain experiences relates to their possession of concepts one runs the risk of embracing unsatisfying philosophical arguments in which conclusions relevant to one conception of nonconceptual and conceptual content are grounded on arguments that concern only the other; arguments that cannot, in themselves, sustain them. (shrink)

(2006). Acting Neoliberal: Is Black Support for Vouchers a Rejection of Progressive Educational Values? Educational Studies: Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 265-278.

This book is without doubt the most meticulously researched, carefully argued, and comprehensive study of Socratic religion to date. When McPherran refers to the religion of Socrates, he means the religion of the historical Socrates. Like many contemporary scholars, McPherran thinks that Plato’s early dialogues are generally reliable sources for the views of the historical Socrates. With uncommon clarity, the author develops the philosophical and religious commitments of this Socrates and shows how they are really complementary parts of a single (...) outlook. Not surprisingly, the very nature of the project generates a multitude of puzzles. McPherran does a masterful job of developing these paradoxes and showing how Socrates was prepared to disarm them. (shrink)

In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates clearly indicates that he is a cognitivist about the emotions—in other words, he believes that emotions are in some way constituted by cognitive states. It is perhaps because of this that some scholars have claimed that Socrates believes that the only way to change how others feel about things is to engage them in rational discourse, since that is the only way, such scholars claim, to change another’s beliefs. But in this paper we show that Socrates (...) is also responsive to, and has various non-rational strategies for dealing with, the many ways in which emotions can cloud our judgment and lead us into poor decision-making. We provide an account of how Socrates can consistently be a cognitivist about emotion and also have more than purely rational strategies for dealing with emotions. (shrink)

We assess Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes in relation to current research on the development of organisms. Our goals are four-fold: first, to present and critically challenge what has become an orthodox interpretation of Aristotle among biologists; second, to present and defend a more adequate account of organismal development; third, to elaborate and justify a novel account of Aristotle's natural teleology, one at odds with the orthodox interpretation; and fourth, to illustrate how our reading of Aristotle, if right, permits (...) a more fruitful encounter between Aristotle and modern biology than that imagined by Aristotle's latter-day biological interpreters. (shrink)

In the Protagoras, Socrates argues that each of the virtue-terms refers to one thing (: 333b4). But in the Laches (190c8–d5, 199e6–7), Socrates claims that courage is a proper part of virtue as a whole, and at Euthyphro 11e7–12e2, Socrates says that piety is a proper part of justice. But A cannot be both identical to B and also a proper part of B – piety cannot be both identical to justice and also a proper part of justice. In this (...) paper we argue that coherent sense can be made of Socrates'' apparently conflicting claims. The key to understanding Socrates'' position, we will argue, is the central role of wisdom among the virtues. It is through the relationship of each virtue to wisdom that each may be said to be the same as all of the others, on the one hand, and also that some virtues may be regarded as proper parts of some other virtues, or as proper parts of virtue in general, on the other. (shrink)